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Introduction
The issues of unemployment and poverty in urban China have aroused a lot of research interest in recent years. Prior to the 1990s, the urban poverty issue was trivial because state provision of jobs and housing, pension, and health insurance benefits were guaranteed for nearly all urban residents. In 1990, the number of the urban poor was estimated to be only 1.3 million, or 0.4 percent of the urban population (World Bank, 1992) . During the 1990s, labor markets in urban China witnessed two important changes. First, widespread downsizing and closure of state-owned enterprises led to the layoffs of millions of urban workers, many of whom were not covered by government social assistance programs (Giles, Park, and Cai, 2005) . Second, rural to urban migration increased dramatically, especially to large, coastal cities. The 2000 census found that 12.2 percent of the urban population were migrants. In cities (excluding townships), migrants accounted for 14.6 percent of the population and 19.6 percent of employed workers.
Recently, new estimates have been made of the extent of urban poverty in China. The estimated poverty rates have varied depending on the datasets used and the assumptions made in determining the poverty lines for different years.
1 A common shortcoming of all of these studies 1 World Bank (2009) reports a national urban income poverty headcount rate of 2.7 percent using a $2/day poverty line and 9.7 percent using a $3/day poverty line. Meng, Gregory, and Wang (2005) report an urban income poverty rate in 2000 of 1.7 to 4.0 percent using low and high lines calculated based on province-urban specific food bundles. Ravallion and Chen (2007) report a national urban income poverty rate of 0.54 percent in 2002 using a poverty line of 1200 yuan. Khan (1998) reports that urban poverty incidence increased by 12 percent from 1988 to 1995 using the China Household Income and Poverty Survey (CHIPS) data conducted by the Institute of Economics, CASS. The Asian Development Bank (2002) estimated that urban poverty incidence was 4.7 percent in 1998, but varied significantly among provinces. Based on the updated CHIPS data, Li (2001) calculated that the number of the urban poor was 23 million in 1999 with an incidence of 5.1 percent, and the poverty depth became more severe. The study group of the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) estimated that the range of urban poverty incidence was from 4.4 percent to 5.8 percent with no clear trend in increase or decrease between 1991 and 1995 (Ren and Chen, 1996) . New estimates of the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) show that there was a slight reduction of urban poverty from 4.4 percent in 1995 to 3.4 percent in 2000 with the NBS poverty diagnostic line, which is about three is that they use data from surveys that exclude migrant households from the sampling frame.
Most prominently, the National Bureau of Statistics' annual urban household survey does not systematically sample migrants. Large cities in many developing countries have large migrant populations that are poor, frequently living in slums and relying on the informal sector for employment. The United Nations Human Settlements Program (2003) predicted that absent new government interventions given current urbanization trends over the next 30 years one in every three people worldwide would live in urban slums characterized by poor public health, inadequate public services, and widespread violence and insecurity. Thus, exclusion of migrants from urban poverty and inequality measurement could lead to substantial bias.
A couple of recent studies have provided survey-based estimates of the poverty rate of both migrants and local residents. A recent report on urban poverty by the ADB uses data from a one-time survey conducted by NBS of 3600 migrants living in 26 provincial capital cities and 5 other cities (Dalian, Ningbo, Xiamen, Qingdao and Shenzhen) in 1999 to analyze the poverty situation of migrants (ADB, 2004; Hussain 2003) . The report estimates an income poverty headcount rate of 15.2 percent for migrants compared to 10.3 percent for local residents using NBS annual urban survey data for the same cities. A recent study using data from the China Income Distribution Survey (CIDS) conducted in 2002 in collaboration with NBS in cities in 6 provinces estimates income poverty headcount rates of 3 percent for local residents and 10 percent for migrants using locally set poverty lines, and 6 percent for local residents and 16
times that of rural official poverty line (Hussain, 2001 (Hussain, , 2003 . If the benefit line of the Minimum Living Standard Scheme (MLSS) is chosen as the criteria of poverty measurement, urban poverty incidence was about 4. 1-4.3 percent between 2002 and 2004. 3 percent for migrants using a higher poverty line (Du, Gregory, and Meng, 2006) . 2 However, in both of these surveys, incomes of local residents are based on self-recorded diaries used by NBS's annual urban household surveys while the incomes of migrants are based on one-time surveys that are known to produce lower income estimates. In addition, the local resident sample used by the ADB also excluded zero-income households and the CIDS surveyed only rural migrants, excluding urban migrants who are likely to have higher incomes. For all of these reasons, both studies are likely to overstate the poverty rate of migrants relative to local residents.
These problems also mean that studies of urban-rural income gaps which also use the CIDS will underestimate urban-rural income gaps, or overestimate the effect of including migrants on reducing urban-rural differences. However, even with this bias, these chapters find that including migrants has a relatively small effect on measured urban-rural income differences.
In this paper, we analyze data from household surveys in 12 cities in 2004 and 2005 that use a common survey questionnaire and survey methodology for both migrants (including both rural migrants and urban migrants) and local residents. Contrary to previous studies that report that income poverty of migrant households is 1.5 times that of local resident households, we find relatively small differences in the poverty rates of migrants and local residents. Although the hourly wages of rural migrants are much lower than those of local residents, rural migrant households have lower dependency ratios and rural migrants have higher labor force participation rates and work longer hours. Including migrants does increase somewhat measures of urban income inequality. In contrast to poverty comparisons, significant differences between 2 The locally set poverty lines are minimum income per capita lines for obtaining urban dibao subsidy payments.
migrants and local residents are found for non-income welfare indicators such as housing conditions and access to social insurance programs.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the survey data.
Section 3 presents measures of poverty incidence for migrants and local residents. Section 4 describes the characteristics of poor households. Section 5 examines income inequality. Section 6 examines non-income welfare measures, and section 7 concludes.
Data
In 2005 Table 1 summarizes some basic information on the 10 cities. The total population ranges from 6.6 to 13.5 million in the 5 large cities, and from 0.6 to 1.7 million in the 5 small cities.
The average size of the total population in the 5 large cities is 8.5 million, or 7.4 times that in the 5 small cities. There is substantial variation in the level of economic development across cities, with coastal cities (Shanghai, Fuzhou, Wuxi, Zhuhai) having significantly higher per capita incomes.
In each city, representative samples of local residents and migrants were independently selected in a 2-stage procedure. Using recent data on the local resident population of each neighborhood, a fixed number of neighborhoods were selected in each city using probability proportionate to size (PPS) sampling. 5 In each selected neighborhood, a sampling frame (list of households) was constructed in consultation with staff of neighborhood offices. Most neighborhood committees had complete, updated lists of local residents, and information on migrants who had registered as temporary residents. Neighborhood office staff also were aware of unregistered migrants living in the neighborhood, especially those operating small businesses.
Using the constructed sampling frame for each neighborhood, a fixed number of households were randomly sampled in each neighborhood. In large cities, about 500 local resident households and 500 migrant households were sampled, and in the other cities the sample sizes were 400 or 500 of each type of household. In all, the survey collected data on 6324 local resident households and 5521 migrant households (See Table 1 by taking the population-weighted average of all dibao lines in China after first adjusting for spatial price differences using the indices calculated by Brandt and Holz (2005) . As seen in Table   2 , this line is equal to 1982 yuan per capita in 2003. It turns out that among our 10 cities, in only two cities (Yichan and Baoji) is the national mean dibao line larger than the actual dibao line.
We also consider 4 other poverty lines. The first is the official rural low income line Table 3 reports the estimates of poverty incidence across cities when using the different poverty lines. Not surprisingly, estimated poverty rates vary with the chosen poverty line. In large cities, the urban poverty headcount rate ranges from 1.3 percent using the low income line to 9.7 percent using the $3/day line; in small cities the headcount rates for the same lines are 3.0 percent and 12.0 percent.
Poverty Incidence
Our main focus is comparing the poverty rates of local residents and migrants, and seeing how inclusion of migrants affects overall measures of poverty and inequality. For large cities, the migrant poverty headcount rate of 1.4 percent is slightly higher than the 1.3 percent poverty rate of local residents using the adjusted rural low income line. However, at higher poverty lines, the poverty rate of migrants is less than that of local residents. Using the national dibao line, the migrant poverty rate is 2.5 percent compared to 3.2 percent for local residents, and using the $3/day line, the migrant poverty rate is 9.6 percent compared to 9.8 percent for local residents.
In small cities, the poverty rate of migrants is clearly higher than that of local residents when using low poverty lines. Using the adjusted rural low income line urban households, the poverty headcount rate of migrants is 5.3 percent compared to 2.6 percent for local residents, and using the national dibao line, the poverty headcount rate was 6.2 percent for migrants compared to 5.6 percent for local residents. However, just as for larger cities, as the poverty line increases, migrant poverty rates in small cities become smaller than that of local urban residents. Using the $3/day line, the poverty headcount rate for migrants is 10.5 percent, compared to 12.4 percent for local residents. Overall the poverty rate differences between migrants and local residents are relatively small, and which is larger depends on which poverty line is chosen.
These differences mask considerable heterogeneity across cities. Table 4 reports the poverty rates for local residents and migrants by city using different poverty lines. Using the national dibao line. In 3 of the 5 large cities and in 4 of 5 small cities, the poverty rate of migrants is higher than that of local residents. 7 The differences across cities are relatively robust to the poverty line chosen.
To what extent is the relatively low poverty rate of migrants due to the fact that the migrant sample includes both rural and urban migrants? We would expect urban migrants to have higher incomes and lower poverty rates than rural migrants. Table 3 presents poverty rates for the rural migrant sample separately. Since 77 percent of migrants are rural migrants, the poverty rate of migrants is generally very close to the poverty rate of rural migrants. However, it is interesting that in large cities, the poverty rate of rural migrants is actually lower than that of all migrants, implying that rural migrants are less likely to be poor than urban migrants. For small cities, we obtain an opposite result; rural migrants have a higher poverty rate than urban migrants.
Using the national mean dibao line, the poverty rate of rural migrants is 2.1 percent compared to 5.1 percent of urban migrants, while for small cities the poverty rate is 6.8 percent for rural migrants and 3.6 percent for urban migrants.
How does the inclusion of migrants affect the measured overall poverty rate in urban areas? Define P to be the urban poverty headcount rate, M P and L P to be the poverty headcount rates for migrants and local residents, respectively, and M R to be the share of migrants in the total urban population. Then, the change in the measured poverty rate associated with the inclusion migrants is the difference between P and L P , which can be expressed as follows:
The impact of migration on the urban poverty rate depends on the difference in the poverty incidences of migrants and local residents and the share of migrants in the population. Given the relatively small differences in estimated poverty rates for migrants and local residents reported in Table 3 and a migrant population share of only 16 percent, it is not surprising that including migrants has a negligible impact on the overall urban poverty estimates (last column of Table 3 ). Even when we use the higher migrant population shares found in the 2000 census to construct sampling weights, including migrants has little effect on overall poverty rate estimates (results not reported). For example, using the national mean dibao line, there is no change in the urban poverty estimates for either large or small cities. Using the adjusted rural low income line and $1/day line, there is no change in poverty estimates for large cities, and an increase in the poverty rate from 2.6 to 3.0 percent in small cities. Using the highest poverty line, the $3/day line, the urban poverty rate decreases from 9.8 percent to 9.7 percent in large cities and from 12.4 percent to 12.0 percent in small cities.
One might be concerned that ignoring the close connection between migrants and their and urban migrants are
In fact, many larger work units do not report their workers to neighborhood committees at all but rather report directly to local Bureaus of Public Security. families back home may obscure assessments of their true level of welfare. Specifically, migrants in urban areas could be remitting much of their income to non-coresident family members back home, and so have much less disposable income than we are estimating. There are two ways to address this problem. First, we could focus on consumption-based estimates of the poverty rate. However, because migrants must pay significantly more income to rent housing than local residents, using consumption measures actually increases the status of migrants relative to local residents. Calculating imputed rental values of owner-occupied housing is beyond the scope of this paper, but could yield sharper differences in the welfare of urban residents and migrants.
A second approach is to use income per capita net of private remittances in the poverty calculations. If migrants remit a large share of their incomes to family members living in their hometowns, their own living standard in the city may be adversely affected and they may be more likely to be classified as poor. However, according to the survey data, on average net remittances of rural migrants accounts for only 6.9 percent of their income. This compares to 6.0 percent for urban migrants and 3.9 percent for local residents. Thus, adjusting for remittances only reduces the relative income of migrants compared to local residents by 3.0 percent (6.9 percent minus 3.9 percent). Not surprisingly, this has virtually no effect on the relative poverty rates of local residents and migrants, as seen in Table 5 which presents the same poverty headcount rates as Table 3 but using income per capita net of remittances. Comparing Table 5 to Table 3 , we find that none of the previous results are altered. Sen (1992) pointed out that the depth of poverty is highly sensitive to the income distribution of the poor. Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984) put forward the following normalized formula to calculate poverty indices:
Depth of Poverty
Here, z is the poverty line, y is the income of the poor, z y  is the poverty gap, z y z  is the normalized poverty gap, and is a parameter that captures aversion to the degree of poverty.
FGT (0) is the headcount ratio; FGT (1) is the average normalized poverty gap; and FGT (2) is the average squared normalized poverty gap. Table 6 presents the poverty gaps using the national mean dibao line as the poverty line.
In the 5 large cities, the average normalized poverty gap for local residents, migrants, and all residents are 1.5 percent, 1.3 percent and 1.4 percent, while they are 2.7 percent, 4.6 percent and 3.1 percent in the 5 small cities. The average squared normalized poverty gaps for local residents, migrants, and all residents are all 1.0 percent in the 5 large cities, while they are 2.0 percent, 4.1 percent and 2.4 percent in the 5 small cities. Overall, for large cities inclusion of migrants has little impact on measures of the depth of poverty, similar to the results for poverty incidence. However, for the small cities, the depth of poverty of migrants is significantly higher than that of local residents, so that including migrants increases the poverty gap from 2.7 to 3.1 (14.8 percent), and increases the squared poverty gap from 2.0 percent to 2.4 percent (20.0 percent). This is not surprising in light of the earlier evidence that at low poverty lines, in small cities the incidence of poverty was noticeably higher than that of local residents.
Who Are the Urban Poor?
It may be surprising to some readers that migration does not significantly increase urban poverty. A large part of the explanation can be seen by comparing the characteristics of the migrant population with those of local residents, and considering how these differences result from China's unique institutional environment.
In Table 7 , for migrants and local residents, we summarize the means of key employment variables, including labor force participation, unemployment, hourly wages, and hours worked.
The labor force participation rate of adult migrants is 89 percent in large cities and 84 percent in small cities, compared to 56 and 50 percent for adult local residents. Similarly, the unemployment rate of migrants is 1.6 and 4.5 percent in large and small cities, compared to 8.5
and 8.8 percent for local residents.
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Finally, migrants on average work 283 hours per month in large cities and 250 hours per month in small cities, compared to 184 and 183 hours per week for local residents. Thus, in large cities, even though mean hourly earnings of migrants is only about a third of that of local residents, the share of adult migrants who work is 75 percent greater than the share of adult local residents who work, and migrants typically work more than 50 percent more hours than local residents. In small cities, the hourly wage differences are much less pronounced but the differences in the other employment variables are similar. Another important difference between migrant and local resident households is that the dependency ratio (household size divided by number of able workers) is only 1.5 for migrants and 2.1 for local residents (Table 7) .
These patterns are consistent with a great deal of self-selection characterizing the migration process. First, rural out-migrants tend to have better human capital than the labor that remains behind in rural areas (Wang, et. al., 2004) . Second, in China, all rural households have access to land and are socially connected to their home villages, so that if migrants are unable to find decent-paying jobs in cities, they are likely to return to their family farms. Third, many migrants leave dependents in their home villages, especially if their earnings in the city are insufficient to pay for housing, education, or other costs of living in the city. This means that low-wage earners are less likely to live with dependents, reducing the likelihood of poverty measured on a per capita basis. If a single migrant lives in a work-place dormitory, she only needs to earn 166 yuan per month (including in-kind benefits such as meals) to avoid being poor using the national mean dibao line as the poverty line.
Which households are more likely to be poor? Table 8 summarizes the mean characteristics of non-poor and poor households for both local resident and migrant households.
The characteristics correlated with poverty appear to be similar for both local residents and migrants. First, there is no big difference in the distributions of household size between poor and non-poor households. Second, the dependency ratio is significantly higher among the poor.
Third, the poor tend to be less educated. For local residents, the poor are much less likely to have a college education, while for migrants the poor are much more likely to have primary school education only. Finally, the work status of the poor is very different than that of the nonpoor. Most strikingly, about one fourth of the poor have unemployed workers in their families, compared to just 4.9 percent of non-poor local residents and 1.3 percent of non-poor migrants.
The poor are also much more likely to be out of the labor force.
We analyze the determinants of poverty in a multivariate framework by estimating probit models of poverty status for local residents and migrant households separately. Table 9 presents the marginal probabilities that households are found to be poor, once again using the national mean dibao line as the poverty line. Age, education, and employment variables are for the household head. The findings for the most part confirm the descriptive results presented in Table   8 . For migrant households, if the household head has a middle school education the probability of being poor falls by 1.1 percent compared to not having completed middle school, if the household head is working the probability of being poor falls by 3.2 percent, and if the household head has an urban hukou the probability of being poor falls by 0.9 percent. Poverty of local resident households is not as responsive to these factors, but is more responsive to household size. Increasing household size by one person reduces the probability of being poor by 0.1 percent. The results also suggest that for both migrants and local residents, being poor is associated with lack of access to social insurance programs.
Urban Income Inequality
In this section, we examine how migrants affect the overall distribution of income in cities. The simplest way to examine income distributions is to simply plot the empirical distributions. Figure 1 does so for urban and migrant households, separately for large and small cities. We see that compared to local residents, the income distribution for migrant households is more tightly concentrated (narrower tails) around a lower mean in the 5 large cities, and is somewhat similar in shape in the 5 small cities except for at the bottom distribution, where it appears that migrants are more likely to be very poor but less likely to have incomes in the range just above the poorest levels.
We can also use Lorenz curves to compare income distributions. As shown in Figure 2 , the income Lorenz curves of local resident and migrant households intersect for the 5 large cities, but most of the income Lorenz curve of local residents is below that of migrant households, suggesting that income inequality of local residents is greater than that of migrant households.
In contrast, the income Lorenz curve of local residents is above Lorenz curve for migrant households for the 5 small cities, so that income inequality of local residents appears to be smaller than that of migrant households. Compared with rural migrants, the income Lorenz curves of urban migrants are below them in both large cities and small cities. In general, it also appears that income inequality is greater in the small cities than in the large cities. Table 10 summarizes income inequality of local residents, migrants, and total populations using two commonly used inequality measures--the Gini coefficient and the Theil index. The
Gini is more sensitive to changes in the middle of the distribution while the Theil index is more sensitive to changes in the tails of the distribution. Comparing the Gini (Theil) measures of local resident and migrant households, we find that the former is greater than the latter in 3 of 5 large cities, in 2 of 5 (1 of 5) small cities, and also in Daqing and Shenzhen. For the 5 large cities combined, the Gini coefficient for local residents is 0.388, larger than the Gini for migrants (0.376). For the 5 small cities, in contrast, the Gini coefficient for local residents (0.404) is lower than that for migrants (0.481). Using the Theil index, inequality is greater for migrants both in large cities and in small cities. Finally, comparing the inequality measures for the total population with that for local residents only, we find that using either the Gini or Theil measures, inequality is greater with the inclusion of migrants. For the large cities, the increase is very slight, while for small cities, the increases are significant (the Gini increases from 0.402 to 0.418 and the Theil index increases from 0.282 to 0.337).
The Theil index is one of the generalized entropy (GE) indices, which have the attractive property that they are easily decomposed. Theoretically, a GE index can be additively decomposed into two components: within-group inequality and between-group inequality. It is straightforward to derive the following expression for the change in inequality caused by including migrants in the sample:
Here, GE M and GE L are the subgroup income inequality measures for migrant and local resident households, S M is the income share of migrants, and GE_B is between-group inequality. The impact of migration on the urban income distribution depends on the difference of income inequality among migrants and among local residents, the overall income share of migrant 11 Assume GE_W and GE_B represent within-group and between-group inequality, S M is the income share of migrants, and GE M and GE L are the subgroup income inequality measures for migrants and local residents. We can decompose urban income inequality as follows:
(
is the change in the urban income inequality when migrant households are included in the sample, deriving (2) is straightforward.
households, and the difference in mean incomes of migrants and local residents 12 .
One can see from the first argument in (2) that the similarity in inequality of migrant incomes and local resident incomes leads to little change in overall inequality in large cities when migrants are included, but the greater inequality of migrant incomes in small cities leads to greater inequality in small cities when migrants are included in the sample. Between-group inequality does not appear to contribute significantly to changes in inequality in large cities, even though the mean income per capita of local residents is 27.6 percent greater than that of migrants.
In small cities, the mean income per capita of migrants actually is 19.8 percent greater than that of local residents.
Non-income welfare differences
We next examine differences between local residents and migrants with respect to non-income welfare measures. In recent years, there has been much concern that migrants are discriminated against with respect to access to decent quality housing, access to social insurance and social assistance programs, and access to basic public services such as education (Cai and Wang, 2005) . Table 11 describes the housing conditions and access to social insurance programs based on the CULS data. The average area of housing are per capita for migrants was 10.7 square meters, compared to 18.4 square meters for local residents, and migrant housing has much lower rates of provision of drinking water, sewage, and heating. Table 11 also makes clear that migrants have almost no chance of obtaining valuable pension, unemployment insurance, or health insurance benefits, partly because most work in the private sector where such benefits often are not provided, and partly because of discriminatory policies of local governments. In contrast, most local residents have pension programs and have health insurance. Finally, other research using the CULS data finds that migrants must pay significantly higher school fees for their children if they do not have local hukous. By policy, migrants are not eligible for the urban dibao program or other urban social assistance programs.
Overall, it appears that inequality between migrants (especially rural migrants) and local residents in non-income dimensions of welfare are much higher than is reflected in a simple comparison of income per capita levels or income-based poverty measures.
Conclusion
The main finding of this paper is that based on analysis of recent survey data from the 2005 China Urban Labor Survey in 10 cities, we find that accounting for migrants does not significantly alter income-based estimates of urban poverty and inequality in China. This is not to say that migrants face no problems living and working in cities. Quite to the contrary, studies using the same data find that migrants earn lower wages than local residents after controlling for observable characteristics, and they are much worse off than local residents in terms of a number of important non-income welfare indicators.
The lack of significant income poverty among migrants reflects China's unique institutions, which have enabled migration to be a selective process. Most migrants living in urban areas work long hours and have relatively few dependents living with them in the cities. It is not obvious, however, whether such selectivity will persist as migration continues to increase in the future. According to United Nations predictions, 53.2 percent of China's total population will live in cities and townships by 2020. The vast majority (more than 70 percent) of migrants surveyed by the CULS desired to stay in cities, with less than 20 percent of them wanting to return home (Table 12 ). The survey also found that about one third of migrants definitely expect to live in cities permanently, half report a likelihood of living in cities in the future, and only 15.5 percent expecting not to live in cities (Table 12 ). The mean duration that surveyed migrants had lived in the city exceeded 9 years in 2005, compared to about 7 years in the first wave of the CULS in 2001. This suggests that the nature of migration in China is quickly shifting from temporary, individual migration to permanent, family-based migration. This could lead to higher rates of unemployment and larger dependency ratios among migrant households in the future, as migration choices become increasingly irreversible.
The survey data suggest that poverty among migrants is not a severe problem in urban areas. However, there exist significant differences between migrants (especially rural migrants) and local residents in access to housing, social insurance programs, social assistance, and public services. As migration becomes increasingly permanent, it will be a great challenge to enable migrant households to become equal members of urban communities. 
